Die unten abgebildete Originalkarte ist die geographische Umsetzung des geheimen Zusatzprotokolls des Deutsch-Sowjetischen Nichtangriffspaktes, auch Molotow-Ribbentrop-Pakt bzw. Hitler-Stalin-Pakt genannt, der in der Nacht vom 23. zum 24. August 1939 in Moskau von dem deutschen Außenminister Joachim von Ribbentrop und Wjatscheslaw Molotow, dem sowjetischen Volkskommissar für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten im Beisein Josef Stalins und des deutschen Botschafters Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg unterzeichnet wurde.
“Für den Fall einer politisch-geographischen Umgestaltung Europas” sah das Protokoll die Aufteilung Osteuropas in deutsche und russische Interessensphären vor – im Falle des Baltikums inklusive Finnland sollten Lettland, Estland und Finnland in der sowjetischen Interessensphäre liegen, Litauen in der deutschen. Polen wurde ziemlich genau entlang der Flüsse Narew, Weichsel und San zwischen Deutschland und der UdSSR halbiert und Bessarabien an Russland konzediert.
Die geplante “Umgestaltung” Europas begann am 1. September 1939 mit dem deutschen Angriff auf Polen – die Sowjets nahmen ab dem 17. September teil und rückten ihrerseits in Ostpolen ein. In der Realität ergaben sich später geringfügige Abweichungen von den vorher ausgemachten Grenzen, die die folgende Grafik zeigt:
Obwohl der Pakt ein harter und unerwarteter Schock für die Weltpresse und Weltpolitik war, ist es immer noch weitgehend unbekannt, dass er vom Auswärtigen Amt viele Monate lang heimlich vorbereitet wurde. Während das AA – nach dem Krieg – die Legende aufrechterhalten wollten, dass sie nur ihren Job gemacht hätten und mit Sicherheit keine Nazis waren, sind ihre Bemühungen gut dokumentiert und der Autor hat die Unterlagen im Avalon-Projekt an der Yale Law School and University lokalisiert. Sie werden der Gegenstand eines späteren Beitrags sein.
Hier ein Auszug aus den Avalon-Akten – Ribbentrops Telegramm an den deutschen Botschafter Schulenburg in Moskau vom 14. August 1939, das Stalin über seinen Wunsch nach einem Treffen informierte [Übersetzung folgt].
Über den Zweck und die Ziele der Konferenz bestand bereits vor ihrer Einberufung Einigkeit, wie das Telegramm Nr. 199 des deutschen Botschafters in Moskau, Schulenburgs, vom 21. August bestätigt: Telegramm 199
Die schriftliche Zusammenfassung der Konferenz, von Botschaftsrat Henke:
Memorandum of a Conversation Held on the Night of August 23d to 24th, Between the Reich Foreign Minister, on the One Hand, and Herr Stalin and the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars Molotov, on the Other Hand
The following problems were discussed:
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER stated that the German-Japanese friendship was in no wise directed against the Soviet Union. We were, rather, in a position, owing to our good relations with Japan, to make an effective contribution to an adjustment of the differences between the Soviet Union and Japan. Should Herr Stalin and the Soviet Government desire it, the Reich Foreign Minister was prepared to work in this direction. He would use his influence with the Japanese Government accordingly and keep in touch with the Soviet representative in Berlin in this matter.
HERR STALIN replied that the Soviet Union indeed desired an improvement in its relations with Japan, but that there were limits to its patience with regard to Japanese provocations. If Japan desired war, it could have it. The Soviet Union was not afraid of it and was prepared for it. If Japan desired peace-so much the better! Herr Stalin considered the assistance of Germany in bringing about an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as useful, but he did not want the Japanese to get the impression that the initiative in this direction had been taken by the Soviet Union.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER assented to this and stressed the fact that his cooperation would mean merely the continuation of talks that he had for months been holding with the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin in the sense of an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations. Accordingly, there would be no new initiative on the German side in this matter.
HERR STALIN inquired of the Reich Foreign Minister as to Italian aims. Did not Italy have aspirations beyond the annexation of Albania-perhaps for Greek territory? Small, mountainous, and thinly populated Albania was, in his estimation, of no particular use to Italy.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER replied that Albania was important to Italy for strategic reasons. Moreover, Mussolini was a strong man who could not be intimidated.
This he had demonstrated in the Abyssinian conflict, in which Italy had asserted its aims by its own strength against a hostile coalition. Even Germany was not yet in a position at that time to give Italy appreciable support.
Mussolini welcomed warmly the restoration of friendly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. He had expressed himself as gratified with the conclusion of the Non-aggression Pact.
HERR STALIN asked the Reich Foreign Minister what Germany thought about Turkey.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER expressed himself as follows in this matter: he had months ago declared to the Turkish Government that Germany desired friendly relations with Turkey. The Reich Foreign Minister had himself done everything to achieve this goal. The answer had been that Turkey became one of the first countries to join the encirclement pact against Germany and had not even considered it necessary to notify the Reich Government of the fact.
HERREN STALIN and MOLOTOV hereupon observed that the Soviet Union had also had a similar experience with the vacillating policy of the Turks.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER mentioned further that England had spent five million pounds in Turkey in order to disseminate propaganda against Germany.
HERR STALIN said that according to his information the amount which England had spent in buying Turkish politicians was considerably more than five million pounds.
HERREN STALIN and MOLOTOV commented adversely on the British Military Mission in Moscow, which had never told the Soviet Government what it really wanted.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER stated in this connection that England had always been trying and was still trying to disrupt the development of good relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. England was weak and wanted to let others fight for its presumptuous claim to world domination.
HERR STALIN eagerly concurred and observed as follows: the British Army was weak; the British Navy no longer deserved its previous reputation. England’s air arm was being increased, to be sure, but there was a lack of pilots. If England dominates the world in spite of this, this was due to the stupidity of the other countries that always let themselves be bluffed. It was ridiculous, for example, that a few hundred British should dominate India.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER concurred and informed Herr Stalin confidentially that England had recently put out a new feeler which was connected with certain allusions to 1914. It was a matter of a typically English, stupid manoeuvre. The Reich Foreign Minister had proposed to the Führer to inform the British that every hostile British act, in case of a German-Polish conflict, would be answered by a bombing attack on London.
HERR STALIN remarked that the feeler was evidently Chamberlain’s letter to the Führer, which Ambassador Henderson delivered on August 23 at the Obersalzberg. Stalin further expressed the opinion that England, despite its weakness, would wage war craftily and stubbornly.
HERR STALIN expressed the opinion that France, nevertheless, had an army worthy of consideration.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, on his part, pointed out to Herren Stalin and Molotov the numerical inferiority of France. While Germany had available an annual class of more than 300,000 soldiers, France could muster only 150,000 recruits annually. The West Wall was five times as strong as the Maginot Line. If France attempted to wage war with Germany, she would certainly be conquered.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER observed that the Anti-Comintern Pact was basically directed not against the Soviet Union but against the Western democracies. He knew, and was able to infer from the tone of the Russian press, that the Soviet Government fully recognized this fact.
HERR STALIN interposed that the Anti-Comintern Pact had in fact frightened principally the City of London and the small British merchants.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER concurred and remarked jokingly that Herr Stalin was surely less frightened by the Anti-Comintern Pact than the City of London and the small British merchants. What the German people thought of this matter is evident from a joke which had originated with the Berliners, well known for their wit and humour, and which had been going the rounds for several months, namely, “Stalin will yet join the Anti-Comintern Pact.”
7) Attitude of the German people to the German-Russian Non-aggression Pact:
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER stated that he had been able to determine that all strata of the German people, and especially the simple people, most warmly welcomed the understanding with the Soviet Union. The people felt instinctively that between Germany and the Soviet Union no natural conflicts of interests existed, and that the development of good relations had hitherto been disturbed only by foreign intrigue, in particular on the part of England.
HERR STALIN replied that he readily believed this. The Germans desired peace and therefore welcomed friendly relations between the Reich and the Soviet Union.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER interrupted here to say that it was certainly true that the German people desired peace, but, on the other hand, indignation against Poland was so great that every single man was ready to fight. The German people would no longer put up with Polish provocation.
In the course of the conversation, HERR STALIN spontaneously proposed a toast to the Führer, as follows:
“I know how much the German nation loves its Führer; I should therefore like to drink to his health.”
HERR MOLOTOV drank to the health of the Reich Foreign Minister and of the Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg.
HERR MOLOTOV raised his glass to Stalin, remarking that it had been Stalin who – through his speech of March of this year, which had been well understood in Germany-had brought about the reversal in political relations.
HERREN MOLOTOV and STALIN drank repeatedly to the Non-aggression Pact, the new era of German-Russian relations, and to the German nation.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER in turn proposed a toast to Herr Stalin, toasts to the Soviet Government, and to a favourable development of relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.
9) When they took their leave, HERR STALIN addressed to the Reich Foreign Minister words to this effect:
The Soviet Government takes the new Pact very seriously. He could guarantee on his word of honour that the Soviet Union would not betray its partner.
Moscow, August 24, 1939.https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns053.asp
(© John Vincent Palatine 2019)